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I. INTRODUCTION
With the power and membership of labor unions declining every
year1 and the popularity and revenue from adult entertainment
products and services rising at astronomical rates,2 it is logical that
* Holly J. Wilmet received a Bachelor’s degree in political science and Russian studies at the
University of Southern California and a Juris Doctorate from the Washington College of Law at
American University. Wilmet is currently an associate with the Law Office of Joseph D.
Gebhardt, P.C. in Washington, D.C., which concentrates its practice in labor employment
discrimination and civil rights law.
1. Union membership has declined steadily since the 1960s and last year fell another
159,000 to 16.1 million members, just 14 percent of the work force. To replenish its
diminishing ranks, the American Federation of Labor—Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) now vows to actively recruit women, who make up approximately 40% of the
nation’s trade union membership. See Kieran Murray, Dwindling Labor Unions Recruit Women,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1998, at 9.
2. Revenues from the legal adult entertainment industry are conservatively estimated at
at least $10 billion a year and include home video sales and rentals at $3.1 billion a year; adult
content films and sexually oriented interactive games on CD-ROMs at $300 million a year;
internet services; cable, satellite, and pay-per-view TV; and “gentlemen’s clubs,” upscale strip
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organized labor would, at some point, turn its attention to one of the
last unorganized and disenfranchised groups of workers in America:
adult entertainers.3 Not only are adult entertainers appropriate for
union organization,4 but they want to be organized.5 Nevertheless,
organized labor has all but turned its back to the exotic dancers and
pornographic movie actors seeking assistance in securing minimum
wages, benefits and job security.6 But, unlike most workers who are
clubs offering tuxedoed doormen, valet parking, and stock options traded on NASDAQ, which
bring in over $100,000 a week, not to mention revenues from the over 2,200 more traditional
strip clubs, peep shows, X-rated theatres, and adult bookstores. See Anthony Flint, Skin Trade
Spreading Across U.S. High Tech Finds Boon for $106 Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1996, at A1.
3. See generally Tom Kuntz, Dancers of a Tawdry World, United: Organized Labor’s Red-Light
Beacon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1997, at 7 (discussing the first union contract in the nation covering
workers in the sex trade).
4. The mission of the AFL-CIO includes: “To aid workers in securing improved wages,
hours, and working conditions . . . to promote the organization of the unorganized into unions
of their own choosing for mutual aid, protection and advancement . . . to encourage all workers
without regard to race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion, age, disability, or sexual
orientation to share equally in the full benefits of union organization.” AFL-CIO CONST., art.
II, Objects and Principles 3-4.
5. Exotic dancers’ unionizing efforts date back to the 1940s when the American Guild of
Variety Artists (AGVA) individually represented a large number of dancers through recognition
agreements, casual engagement contracts, and standard contracts for minimum wages on a
dancer-by-dancer, club-by-club basis. The relationship between AGVA and dancers ended
abruptly in 1973 when a federal court first declared nightclub performers to be independent
contractors. Telephone Interview with Paul Bales, Executive Director of AGVA, Southern
California Chapter (Apr. 14, 1998).
Group organizing efforts started up again, without AGVA’s assistance, in the early 1990s at
Pacer’s, a San Diego, Cal. strip club. See Martha Irvine, San Francisco Strippers Enjoy Union
Coverage, LAS VEGAS REV. J., May 12, 1997, at 1A. Those efforts were short-lived, however; the
dancers voted to decertify the union in 1993, due largely to management’s misinformation,
threats, and the hiring of dancers who would not join the union. Id. See also WIS. STATE J., Sept.
4, 1993.
In early 1996, strippers of the Lust Lady peep show in San Francisco, Cal. began organizing
themselves in an effort to persuade club management to remove the one-way mirrors in
customer booths that allowed customers to clandestinely photograph and videotape dancers,
the product of which they feared would begin appearing on the Internet or on bootleg videos
without dancer permission or financial gain. See Kuntz, supra note 3, at 7; see also Telephone
Interview with “Jane,” Organizer/Dancer at the Lusty Lady (Apr. 10, 1998); Jane, No Justice, No
Piece (last modified June 12, 1997) <http://www.bayswan.org/Edjust_piec.html> (explaining
how strippers went from no recognition to union contact ratification). Since then, organizing
efforts have begun in Hollywood, Cal.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Anchorage, Alaska; Massachusetts;
New Jersey; and some provinces within Canada. NEWSLETTER 10 (Exotic Dancers’ Alliance, San
Francisco, Cal.) 1998 (on file with author).
6. In what is generally representative of the working condition demands of most strippers,
the Lusty Lady dancers’ first collective bargaining agreement secured for them the right to be
treated by management “with dignity, respect, courtesy, and trust;” to be free from “an
intimidating, offensive, or hostile work environment;” to “just cause” dismissals which include
“[e]mployer’s opinion regarding employee sexiness while performing, customer interaction
and/or customer satisfaction . . . .”; to one paid sick day; to be free from the arbitrary docking
of pay for missed meetings and sick days; to family/personal leave, provided that “the
[e]mployer approves . . . based on scheduling considerations, the employee states, in writing,
when she expects to return, the dancer’s appearance has not changed materially since she
started her leave (i.e., employee has no additional tattoo or piercing . . . no significant weight
gain or loss), employee returns to work within one week or stated return date;” to a guaranteed

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol7/iss3/3

2

Wilmet: Naked Feminism: The Unionization of the Adult Entertainment Indu

1998-1999]

NAKED FEMINISM

467

customarily approached by union organizers7 these adult entertainers
have had to go door-to-door at the AFL-CIO in an effort to find a union
willing to represent them;8 or, in the porn actress’s case, right to the
door marked “Screen Actors’ Guild.”9 So why then, won’t these labor
pay scale ranging from $12.00 per hour for new hires to $21.00 per hour for dancers employed
31 weeks, plus tips; extra pay for working in the Private Pleasures/talk dirty booth at 50% of
gross receipts; to 10-minute breaks every 40 - 50 minutes on stage, and a 30-minute lunch break,
provided that it is “taken before midnight, Sunday through Thursday, and before 1:00 a.m.
Friday and Saturday”; to paid 15 minutes preparation time; to pay for dancers who undertake
the “selecting, purchasing, and programming” of music; to time plus 1/10 pay for working New
Year’s Eve; to remove the one-way windows; to a grievance and arbitration procedures; and
support staff [bouncers, cashiers, and janitors] to receive two 15-minute paid breaks and one
unpaid 30-minute lunch. See Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Multivue, Inc.,
The Lusty Lady and Local 790, Service Employees International Union, and AFL-CIO, ratified
Apr. 4, 1997 (on file with author); see also Kuntz, supra note 3; Irvine, supra note 5.
In their second CBA, ratified on April 4, 1998, the benefits increased to include up to four paid
sick days (based on hours worked) with no monetary penalty for additional sick days; time and
one-half pay for New Year’s Eve; a guaranteed pay scale of $22.00, which the employer can
increase to $23.00 - 26.00 per hour; and their biggest coup, a hiring cap on the number of
dancers employed at a particular time. See Jane, supra, note 5 (contract on file with author).
7. See It’s the Naked Truth, TULSA WORLD, May 4, 1997, available at 1997 WL 3636315.
8. The Lusty Lady dancers, who sought out Service Employees International Union
(SEIU), Local 790 for representation, initially encountered resistance from the union; but
Local 790 had an informal affiliation with the Exotic Dancers’ Alliance, a San Francisco-based
advocacy group, and with their assistance, persuaded Local 790 to represent them. See Jane,
supra note 5.
In the cases of dancers in Philadelphia and Anchorage the situation was much worse. At the
Oakford Inn in the Philadelphia suburbs, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFLCIO, initially agreed to represent the dancers, and had gone so far as to collect signature cards,
petition the NLRB for approval, schedule an election, and begin a campaign, when they
inexplicably abandoned the effort and the dancers, in mid-campaign. See Jane, supra note 5.
Unsurprisingly, the dancers failed to get enough votes to certify the union, and the effort failed.
Not Covered Strippers Reject Chance to Form Union, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 30, 1997, at 5.
In Anchorage, the Alaska Exotic Dancers’ Union, an independent union, sought out and
initially affiliated with the Teamsters. The Teamsters agreed to represent the dancers of the
Showboat Show Club, but they suddenly abandoned the dancers mid-campaign, warning
organizers “not to call back.” Telephone Interview with Tora Brawley, Alaska Exotic Dancers’
Union, Dancer/Organizer of the Showboat Show Club (Apr. 21, 1998) [hereinafter Brawley
Interview]. As a result of diligent efforts on the part of the dancers’ organizer, the Showboat’s
dancers informally affiliated with the Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees, AFL-CIO. Id.
9. As its name suggests, the Screen Actors’ Guild (SAG) is the major representative for
movie actors, with a membership of nearly 90,000. Dade Hayes, Porn Actress Takes Case to
National Labor Board Films: Performer Files Complaint After Getting Cold Shoulder From the Screen Actors
Guild, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1997, at B5. It operates as a closed union, requiring applicants to
either work on a project financed by a guild signatory (usually a major movie studio or
production company), work three days (or collect three vouchers) as an extra on approved
shows, or be a member of an affiliated entertainment union, prior to being eligible for
membership. Id.
In November 1996, Dalny Marga Valdes, star of more than 70 X-rated films, was denied Guild
membership, and as a result filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
against SAG for discriminatory and arbitrary denial. Telephone Interview with attorney, NLRB,
Southern Cal. Office (Apr. 4, 1998). Those charges were eventually dismissed by the NLRB for
lack of cause. Id. Ms. Valdes seemingly did not meet SAG’s standards for admission and now
has little recourse because SAG, as a private organization, is entitled to set standards for
admission so long as those standards are not constitutionally forbidden. Id. SAG is under no
legal duty as a labor union to accept everyone seeking membership. Id.
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unions accept ready-organized contingents of strippers or porn stars?
Although one could speculate that labor’s reluctance is due to the
controversial and sexual nature of these professions,10 the industry’s
reputed ties to organized crime,11 fear of public backlash, or any
combination thereof, the primary reason for labor’s reluctance may
actually be our nation’s labor laws.12
The National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter “NLRA”] grants most
employees the right to organize and join unions.13 It does not, however,
grant those same rights to supervisors or independent contractors, and
therein lies the distinction.14 By arbitrarily classifying their exotic
dancers as “independent contractors”15 rather than “employees” and
10. Organized labor’s reaction to strippers is representative of the general public’s, and
includes such sentiments as “not taking [them] seriously” and assuming that exotic
dancing/entertaining is “not an honest day’s work.” Wesley Pruden, A Jungle Out There and It’s
Boiling Hot, WASH. TIMES, May 6, 1997, at A4. The porn industry has taken a bold step to be
heard above the roar of condemnation: lobbying. In a successful effort to defeat California
state legislation that would have taxed pornographic materials, a 40-person porn star delegation
went to the state capital and personally lobbied state representatives. The porn industry
currently keeps a full-time lobbyist on payroll. See Mark Katches, Touch of Savvy Helps Porn
Industry Avoid Tax, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 22, 1997, available at 1997 WL 7429157; see also,
Free Speech Coalition, Celebrate Free Speech Lobbying Days 1998 (last modified Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.freespeechcoalition.com/industry/legislation/celebrate.htm>.
11. Rumored affiliations between strip clubs and organized crime are numerous and
notably include: ties to Jack Ruby and the assassination of John F. Kennedy (Ruby, a strip club
owner, said he was not at the assassination because he was at his club dealing with union/Mafia
problems), Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President John F.
Kennedy [a.k.a., Warren Commission Report], Sept. 24, 1964; ownership of San Francisco strip
clubs, including Mitchell Brothers O’Farrell Theatre, the club subject to a class-action suit
discussed herein, Interview by Siobhan Brooks with Dawn Passar, Co-Founder of the Exotic Dancers’
Alliance, (visited Apr. 18, 1999) <http://www.bayswan.org/sioblntvw.html>; “Scores,” a highclass New York City strip club that is the focus of a recent extortion case brought by the
government against John Gotti, Jr., alleging that he demanded payments of both the dancers
and the club owner, Greg B. Smith, Junior’s Brand New Jam: Enforcer Implicates Gotti in Extort
Cases, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 3, 1998, at 7; Showboat Show Club, the Anchorage, Alaska strip
club, which is the subject of current unionizing efforts by dancers, rumored to be controlled by
the Hell’s Angels motorcycle gang, a rumor supported in the continued presence of leatherclad, armed Hell’s Angels at management-union meetings. Brawley Interview, supra note 8.
12. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
13. The National Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) most important provision, section 7, states:
“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
14. Id.
15. Independent contractors are explicitly excluded from the NLRA’s section 7 rights and
other related provisions by section 2(3). 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). This distinction is
important because, although it is not widely known, exotic dancers are of one of two types:
“house” dancers or “features.” See Christine Fuentes, Boogie Nights: The ‘70s Are Alive and Well at
S.F.’s Gold Club, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 30, 1997, at M16. House dancers comprise the majority of
exotic dancers and are the ones misclassified as independent contractors. Id. Generally, these
women work on a continuing basis for one particular club; on exception they may alternate or
simultaneously work for more than one club located in the same area and owned by the same
enterprise. Id. However, it is rare for a dancer to work equal amounts of time for two more
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charging them fees to work16 rather than paying them wages,
proprietors of strip clubs have, until recently, been able to stop
organizers in their tracks, thereby denying dancers the protection and
benefits of collective action.17 The courts have become an active
partner in the continuing financial exploitation of adult entertainers
(namely exotic dancers) by legally classifying various types of stage
entertainers as independent contractors, and thus denying these
workers protection of the labor laws enacted for their benefit.18
That may be about to change, however. Several class action law suits,
collectively involving over 5000 exotic dancers and thirty-one strip clubs,
have been filed19 in the state courts of California20 and Nevada.21 The
independently owned strip clubs. Thus, a multiple-employer situation would not arise during
unionization and collective bargaining. Id.
A “Feature” is hired by the club for promotional purposes for a limited engagement. The
feature is often a pornographic movie actress, magazine centerfold, or other sex industry
celebrity, who will sign autographs or take photos with customers but rarely dance. See, e.g.,
Fuentes, supra note 15, at M16. Those who do dance tend to be individually recognized and
advertised as they travel a “circuit” of strip clubs (i.e., Los Angeles to San Francisco to Las
Vegas). Id. When the clubs visited are owned by separate enterprises, the feature dancer is
properly classified as an independent contractor, and would not be able to join a union. Id. An
exception may arise, however, if the visited clubs are all owned by the same enterprise (which
they often times are). Existing labor law permits union members, once properly part of a
bargaining unit, to work at different job sites of a single employer, and in some cases of
different employers, so long as each employer is party to a collective bargaining relationship
with the union. See Combined Century Theatres, Inc. v. NLRB, 120 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1960), mod.
and enforced, 278 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating that thirteen movie theatre companies are
considered a single employer under the NLRA).
16. An outrageous industry-wide practice requires exotic dancers to pay their employing
strip club for each shift they work. This practice is believed to have originated at the Mitchell
Brothers O’Farrell Theatre in the late 1980s, quickly spreading nationwide. Brooks, supra note
11. These fees, commonly called “stage fees,” “house,” “tip-out,” “rent,” “commission,” “leases,”
etc., purport to be for the right of use of the owner’s facilities as dancers ply their “independent
trade.” Brooks, supra note 11. The fees are often fixed amounts, usually referred to as “stage
fees,” and range between $25-100 per shift. Alternatively, the fees are “tip-outs”— where the
amount to be remitted to the club is determined by a percentage of the dancer’s daily earnings
on “tips,” the price customers pay dancers directly for private table or lap dances. NEWSLETTER
8 (Exotic Dancers Alliance, San Francisco, Cal.) 1997 (on file with author). At some clubs, such
as the Market Street Cinema and Century Theater in San Francisco, the fees reach amounts as
high as $150 per shift. Id.; see Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 937 P.2d 154, 160 (Wash. 1997)
(adjudicating where the Club charged dancers $65 or more for a six to eight hour shift).
17. Brooks, supra note 11.
18. See Associated Musicians of Greater Newark v. Bow & Arrow Manor, 206 N.L.R.B. 581
(1973) (orchestra leader and strolling musicians of restaurant club considered independent
contractors under NLRA); Harrah’s Club v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1971) (casino house band
members considered to be independent contractors under NLRA); Radio City Music Hall Corp. v.
United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943), affirming 50 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding movie
theatre intermission stage performers are to be considered independent contractors).
19. Prior to publication of this article, the first of two California cases, infra note 20, settled for
$2.85 million, which included attorneys’ fees and restitution. Julie N. Lynem, O’Farrell Settles With 500
Dancers: $2.85 Million Includes Restitution, Legal Fees, S. F. CHRON., July 10, 1998, at A22. Because the
settlement reportedly did not include any admission of liability, the claims and issues contained
therein remain untested in the courts. It is, therefore, in this author’s opinion, appropriate to
discuss the issue as a pending matter (with this disclaimer).
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legal basis of each suit is that strip club proprietors have improperly
classified their exotic dancers as independent contractors, rather than
employees, in violation of state and federal wage and hour laws.22
Success on the merits would mean the dancers are legally entitled to
back wages, reimbursement of stage fees, and other damages.23 To win
their cases, these women must demonstrate that their classification as
independent contractors is a subterfuge (likely created by club owners
to avoid employment-related costs and taxes);24 that the reality of their
employment situation clearly demonstrates that club owners, not
dancers, control the actual working conditions within the clubs; and
that, accordingly, exotic dancers lack the business independence
required for classification as independent contractors.25
This article explores the legal basis for the dancers’ claims, from the
treatment of employees and independent contractors under the NLRA,
the Fair Labor Standards Act, and California and Nevada state laws, to
the corresponding federal and state courts’ interpretations, tests, and
20. Two class-action lawsuits have been filed in California to date. In the first, Vickery v.
Cinema Seven, Inc., 480 former exotic dancers of the O’Farrell Theatre—a unique multi-theme
roomed strip club in San Francisco, billed as “the adult Disneyland,” and best known for on-stage
and private seating live performances of sexual acts involving multiple dancers and/or sexual
“props/toys”—sued the club for back wages and reimbursement of stage fees. See Caren Benjamin,
Strippers Expand Wage Lawsuit to Additional Las Vegas Clubs, LAS VEGAS REV. J., June 12, 1997, at 5B.
The dancers alleged that in 1988 the club impermissibly changed the classification of its exotic
dancers from employees to independent contractors, simultaneously stopping the payment of wages
and implementing the practice of charging stage fees. Id. The dancers were granted class action
status in May 1995. See id.
The second lawsuit, filed in Los Angeles Superior Court on December 9, 1998, pits five exotic
dancers (seeking to represent a class that includes all dancers employed at the clubs since 1994)
against 23 strip clubs in the Southern California, San Fernando Valley region. See Peter Hartlaub,
Strippers Sue Clubs Over Work Status, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 10, 1998, at N8. Here too, the dancers
allege a “sham independent contractor arrangement” exists between the clubs and the dancers that
work at them. Id. The dancers hope that this lawsuit will reward them with punitive damages and
employee-status, and the benefits that accompany that status, such as hourly wages, disability
insurance, job benefits, workers’ compensation and overtime pay. Id.
21. In Roe v. Cheetah’s Lounge, over 5000 former and present exotic dancers as a § B(2) class,
are suing for unpaid wages, overtime wages, reimbursement of monies paid to the clubs as “tip-outs,
rent, commission, locker fees,” reimbursement for costume/uniform expenses, and declaratory
judgment prohibiting the future sharing of tips and gratuities, and requiring payment of minimum
wages. Petitioner’s First Amended Complaint for Class Action Relief at 8-13, Roe v. Cheetah’s
Lounge (D. Ct. Nev.) (No. A371500) (on file with author).
22. Benjamin, supra note 20, at 5B.
23. Benjamin, supra note 20, at 5B.
24. The manner in which the principal handles any tax obligations is of no significance in
determining employment status under California law. Letter from Miles Locker, Attorney for
Cal. Labor Comm’n (Oct. 10, 1997) (citing Toyota Motor Sales v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 3d
864, 877 (1990) (“An employer cannot change the status of an employee to one of an independent
contractor by illegally requiring him to assume a burden which the law imposes directly on the
employer.”)) (on file with author).
25. See Yard Bird, Inc. v. Virginia Employment Comm’n, 503 S.E. 2d 246, 253 (Va. Ct. App.
1998) (explaining that the club exercised actual or potential control over dancers, and dancers
were not engaged in independently established businesses).
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classification of exotic dancers.26 The facts suggest that these cases
would be successful under both California and Nevada law, as well as
federal law.27 Furthermore, these lawsuits present the court with an
ideal opportunity to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act’s model of
employee/independent contractor law to the adult entertainment
industry. Such a definitive judicial application would not only benefit
public policy and the working conditions of thousands of working
women, but may also have possible persuasive value in any subsequent
NLRA action.28
Assuming that judicial determination of exotic dancers’ employee
status on a class-wide basis would subsequently lead to an industry-wide
change in the practice of treating dancers as independent contractors -either voluntary, through further legal action, or by collective action on
the part of dancers -- this article explores the future of their
unionization and the unavoidable implications for the feminist
movement.29
II. APPLICABLE LAWS
The primary statute granting employees the right to organize and
collectively bargain is the NLRA. Since 1935, despite subsequent
amendments in 194730 and 1959, it has acted as the primary powerequalizing tool for employees.31 Not only does the NLRA grant
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part II.
28. It should be noted that the NLRB has complete autonomy in deciding cases arising
under the NLRA, and therefore would not be bound by a trial court’s determination of
dancers’ employee status. The Board may, however, be influenced by such action. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1994) (stating the purpose of the Act to be to benefit public policy and working
conditions).
29. See infra Part II (discussing how the case of pornographic movie actors differs from that
of exotic dancers in that their unionization issues turn more on the labor laws regarding union
representation and membership, rather than wage and hour laws). Unfortunately, there is no
legal precedent holding a union responsible to an individual for denied membership in that
union. As a result, the unionizing efforts of pornographic movie actors will not be specifically
discussed further in the context of this article.
30. In 1947, an anti-Labor, Republican-led Congress amended the NLRA with the Taft-Hartley
Act, which was significant in two respects: First, it specifically excluded independent contractors
from NLRA protection, a direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Hearst
Enterprises, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (using the “economic factors” test [a.k.a., “statutory purpose” test]
and finding newsboys to be employees covered under the NLRA); second, the amendments
permitted employers to actively campaign against unions during the pre-election campaign,
provided that there was “no threat of reprisal, or force, or benefit.”
31. As stated in the National Labor Relations Act:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours,
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